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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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cruel regime and deported millions of Russians into forced labour. In
fact,, it was the reverse/' wrote W. Chambering the expert on Russian
affairs, in the New Leader on March 4. " Then who should be guaranteed
and against whom ? Poland and Finland against Russia or the Soviets
against their small neighbours ? "

The argument that the Soviet Empire was to be cc reassured against
future attacks from the West ..." by removing a frontier from one place
to another or annexing a strip of territory, less than one per cent of the
Soviet's own Empire, could convince only those who wanted to be
convinced. This reason employed by Churchill was subjected to the
strongest of attacks in the World Press, which pointed out that such
arguments could equally justify the removal of the Soviet frontier to the
r^ Rhine or even the Atlantic Ocean.

Churchill's ce very cautiously worded speech " was in a vein not
to arouse " the hostility of many people." It contained one striking
statement, however, which raised a query as to why it had been made ?
Namely, " the British view of 1919 had been expressed in the so-called
Curzon Line." This so-called * Curzon Line ' was proposed in 1920 as
a ' zone 50 km. wide * to the East of that c Line,' but since both sides
concerned were completely disinterested in this ' Line ' (which originated
in Paris and was not even created by an Englishman), it was never to get
further than the stage of being mentioned in the dispatches.
In 1919 the British Government had held no settled opinion as to where
the western frontier of Russia should be fixed. That country was then
trembling under the spasms of a great conflagration and London, waiting
on the issue of the Civil War, and intervening in the meanwhile with her
armed forces in Russia, realised that the frontier which they had been
ready to recognise for Tsarist Russia must be different to the one which
they could recognise for the Bolshevik regime. In the event of a victory
of the old regime, Britain had had no wish to become uselessly involved
in an argument over the western frontier of Russia, since along with
France, she still had to take into consideration the commitments she had
given to that regime., and the eventual compensation for Russia's re-
nouncement of her claims to the Turkish Straits as promised by the Allies
in the secret Treaty of 1915.
The attitude of the Allies towards the Bolsheviks at that time was well-
known  there was war between them. The Supreme Council of Allied
Powers, in authorising the Polish Government on June 25, 1919, to take
over Eastern Galicia, asked it to " safeguard the integrity of persons and
property of peace-loving population . . . against danger arising from
Bolshevik gangs."
Urged by the Polish Government and awaiting the outcome of the war,
the Supreme Council of the Allies had in the interim on December 8, 1919^
recognised Polish administration west of the Eastern frontier of the Polish
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